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NOTE
Creating an Impossible Burden: State ex rel.
Becker v. Wood and Prosecutorial
Vindictiveness
State ex rel. Becker v. Wood, 611 S.W.3d 510 (Mo. 2020) (en banc).
Rachael Moore*

I. INTRODUCTION
In the American criminal justice system, prosecutors have an
enormous amount of discretion and power.1 With dockets growing more
cramped, prosecutors often use threats of harsher charges and sentences to
deter defendants from exercising their right to a jury trial or an appeal.2
Prosecutors can also wield this power for purely vindictive or retaliatory
purposes, as one prosecutor noted when reflecting on his career:
Sometimes a public defender or a defense lawyer will just try and bust
your ass all the time. Frankly, you end up busting theirs back. You get
irritated, but you try not to take it out on the people they represent…
Should you penalize him for that? No. Do we? Probably, sometimes.
You try not to, but we're human.3

When prosecutors sidestep their ethical obligations in this way,
defendants have one possible remedy: striking the enhanced charges by

*B.A., University of Missouri, 2021 dual-degree program; J.D. Candidate, University
of Missouri School of Law, 2022; Note and Comment Editor, Missouri Law Review,
2021–2022; Associate Member, Missouri Law Review, 2020–2021; I would like to
thank Associate Dean Paul Litton for his insight and edits, and thank you to the
editorial staff of the Missouri Law Review for their help during the editing process.
1
Murray R. Garnick, Two Models of Prosecutorial Vindictiveness, 17 GA. L.
REV. 467, 467–68 (1983).
2
Id. at 474–75.
3
MARK BAKER, D.A.: PROSECUTORS IN THEIR OWN WORDS 116–17 (1999).

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository,

1

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 87, Iss. 1 [], Art. 11

270

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 87

proving prosecutorial vindictiveness.4 The Supreme Court of the United
States has created two tests for a defendant to prove prosecutorial
vindictiveness when a prosecutor increases or enhances charges: the
presumption of prosecutorial vindictiveness test and the objective
evidence test.5 Missouri courts have adopted both of these tests and
applied them to various situations beyond merely an enhancement in
charges.6
In State ex rel. Becker v. Wood, the Supreme Court of Missouri was
asked to apply the tests to a case where a newly elected prosecutor filed a
notice of intent to seek the death penalty seven weeks before trial, months
after the defendant, Aaron Hodges, had withdrawn from plea
negotiations.7 The court was also asked whether a prosecutor can be
required to testify before a judge to help a defendant prove prosecutorial
vindictiveness.8 The Supreme Court of Missouri held that a prosecutor’s
decision making when charging defendants was protected attorney workproduct and thus, prosecutors cannot be compelled to testify.9 The court
found that Hodges had not met the presumption of prosecutorial
vindictiveness test and remanded to the lower court to determine if Hodges
could make a showing under the objective evidence test.10 In its reasoning,
the court seemed to suggest that defendants are foreclosed from creating a
presumption of prosecutorial vindictiveness at the pretrial stage and that
only an increase in charges, not an increase in penalty, is sufficient to
create a presumption.11
This Note examines how the majority’s reasoning in State ex rel.
Becker v. Wood creates an almost impossible burden for defendants to
prove prosecutorial vindictiveness before trial or when a prosecutor seeks
the death penalty. Part II discusses the facts and holding of State ex rel.
Becker v. Wood. Part III examines the history of the death penalty in
Missouri, as well as the history of prosecutorial vindictiveness as
developed through the federal courts and Missouri cases. Part IV

4

Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 27–28 (1974).
United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 372, 380–84 (1982).
6
See State v. Cayson, 747 S.W.2d 155, 156–58 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987); State v.
Potts, 181 S.W.3d 228, 230–35 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005); State v. Molinett, 876 S.W.2d
806, 808–10 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994); State v. Sapien, 337 S.W.3d 72, 80 (Mo. Ct. App.
2011).
7
State ex rel. Becker v. Wood, 611 S.W.3d 510, 512 (Mo. 2020) (en banc), reh'g
denied (Dec. 22, 2020).
8
Id. at 513.
9
Id. at 513–14.
10
Id. at 517.
11
Id. at 515–16.
5
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discusses the majority’s reasoning in creating a higher burden in State ex
rel. Becker v. Wood, including a discussion of Judge Russell’s dissent.
Part V discusses the flaws in the majority’s reasoning regarding both the
presumption test and objective evidence test, the impact of the court’s
analysis of the death penalty as it relates to prosecutorial vindictiveness,
and the potential ramifications on defendants’ ability to prove
prosecutorial vindictiveness in the future.

II. FACTS AND HOLDING
In the early morning of June 22, 2015, police received a call that a
burglar had broken into an apartment in Pacific, Missouri and was
subsequently detained by the residents of the apartment.12 Upon arrival,
Police found Aaron Hodges, who had broken in and was “making very off
the wall statements,” including saying that he was being possessed and
attacked by demons and killing people.13 Police contacted the Critical
Intervention Team, which concluded that Hodges needed to be transported
to the hospital.14 Hodges was then committed for a ninety-six-hour
psychiatric evaluation.15
Around 8:30 p.m. that same day, Madeline Dreiling drove to her son
Cory’s apartment.16 Cory Dreiling was autistic and living alone for the
first time. Ms. Dreiling had not heard from Cory for ten hours and was
worried. When she entered the apartment, Ms. Dreiling found her son and
his roommate both brutally murdered in their apartment.17 Cory Dreiling’s
apartment sat four buildings away from the apartment that Aaron Hodges
had attempted to burglarize earlier that morning.18
While investigating the murder, police learned that Aaron Hodges
lived in the victims’ building and that Mr. Hodges would often play video

12

Ed Pruneau, Man Arrested Before Murder Victims Found, Spoke of Demons,
26, 2015), https://www.emissourian.com/local_news/crime/manarrested-before-murder-victims-found-spoke-of-demons/article_a0fb9a4c-a87e572d-971d-7087a7dabe5c.html [https://perma.cc/2PBF-AKYS].
13
Id.
14
Id.
15
Id.
16
Pauline Masson, Mother Wants Justice For Her Son, Roommate,
EMISSOURIAN (Dec. 6, 2017), https://www.emissourian.com/mother-wants-justicefor-her-son-roommate/article_102d360e-0a78-5c0a-8d21-cefccdb6be1e.html
[https://perma.cc/ES5L-9DUX].
17
Id.
18
Pruneau, supra note 12.
EMISSOURIAN (June
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games with the victims.19 Hodges’s proximity to the victims, coupled with
his bizarre statements when officers found him at the burglary scene led
police to go to the St. Louis hospital where Hodges was being evaluated.20
Police arrested Hodges for the murders and interviewed him under
controlled conditions.21 Growing frustrated with a lack of progress in the
interview, the officers took Hodges back to the murder scene.22 Confronted
with both the physical evidence at the scene and the brutality of the
murders, Hodges allegedly confessed to the murders, describing the events
in detail.23 Hodges was then served with a grand jury indictment charging
him with the murders and was taken back to jail.24
On July 15, 2015, Hodges was arraigned and pleaded not guilty.25 He
filed a jury trial waiver in January of 2016, and he and Franklin County
elected prosecutor, Robert Parks, began plea negotiations.26 Hodges’s
scheduled guilty plea was continued numerous times over the next two and
a half years.27 Finally, on June 15, 2018, Hodges filed notice of his intent
to proceed to trial and raise the defense of not guilty by reason of
insanity.28 The State subsequently withdrew all outstanding plea offers.29
Prosecutor Robert Parks retired during this time, and Matthew Becker was
elected Franklin County prosecutor in January 2019.30 On February 26,
2019, the case was set for a trial starting that September.31
On July 24, 2019, five months after setting the trial date and seven
weeks before trial, the prosecutor’s office filed a notice of intent to seek
the death penalty.32 Hodges filed a motion to strike the State’s intention
to seek the death penalty, alleging prosecutorial vindictiveness in
retaliation for Hodges proceeding to trial.33 Hodges also filed a motion
endorsing both Becker and Associate Prosecuting Attorney Matthew

19

Id.
Id.
21
Id.
22
Id.
23
Id.
24
Id.
25
Brief for Respondent at 4, State ex rel. Becker v. Wood, 611 S.W.3d 510 (Mo.
2020) (No. SC 98416).
26
State ex rel. Becker v. Wood, 611 S.W.3d 510, 512 (Mo. 2020) (en banc).
27
Id.
28
Id.
29
Id.
30
Id.
31
Brief for Respondent, supra note 25, at 6.
32
Becker, 611 S.W.3d. at 512.
33
Id.
20
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Houston as witnesses to testify at the hearing regarding the motion to
strike.34 The circuit court entered an order requiring Becker and Houston
to appear and give sworn testimony at the hearing, leading Becker to
petition the Missouri Court of Appeals for a writ of prohibition to prevent
him from being required to testify.35 The Missouri Court of Appeals
denied the writ.36 Becker then sought a writ from the Supreme Court of
Missouri, which granted the appeal and issued a preliminary writ of
prohibition.37
The Supreme Court of Missouri later made permanent the writ of
prohibition on the order requiring Becker and Houston to testify, holding
that: (1) a prosecutor’s choice whether to seek the death penalty is
protected attorney-work product, and (2) Hodges had not shown a
presumption of prosecutorial vindictiveness to shift the burden to the |State
to disprove the alleged vindictiveness.38 The court remanded the case to
the trial court to determine if Hodges met the objective evidence test;
however, Hodges would have to prove this without any testimony from
the prosecutors.39

III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Prosecutors have “more control and discretion” than any other
member of the criminal justice system.40 They decide the charge, plea
bargain, and recommended sentence.41 When it comes to deciding
whether to charge a defendant and what charge to bring, prosecutors have
“enormous power.”42 Absent evidence of discrimination, defendants have
few, if any, remedies to challenge a prosecutor’s charging decisions.43
When prosecutors stretch the ethical and legal boundaries of their
discretion, however, one potential remedy for defendants is showing
prosecutorial vindictiveness.44 Prosecutorial vindictiveness arises when a
prosecutor, in an effort to deter a defendant from exercising constitutional
34

Id. at 513.
Id.
36
Id.
37
Id.
38
Id. at 513–14.
39
Id. at 514.
40
Garnick, supra note 1, at 468.
41
Id. at 468–69.
42
Ellen S. Podgor, The Ethics and Professionalism of Prosecutors in
Discretionary Decisions, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1511, 1516 (2000).
43
Id. at 1516–17.
44
See Garnick, supra note 1, at 475.
35
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or statutory rights that delay legal proceedings, uses their discretion in
charging and offering sentences to threaten or punish a defendant.45

A. Prosecutorial Vindictiveness Nationally
The Supreme Court of the United States first considered the issue of
prosecutorial vindictiveness in 1974 in Blackledge v. Perry.46 In
Blackledge, the defendant was convicted of misdemeanor assault with a
deadly weapon in a North Carolina trial court.47 Under North Carolina
law, defendants had a right to a trial de novo in North Carolina Superior
Court after a conviction.48 When the defendant filed his notice of appeal
and intention to seek a trial de novo in superior court, the prosecutor
charged the defendant with felony assault with a deadly weapon.49 The
Supreme Court held that the State was constitutionally barred from
bringing a more serious charge in response to the defendant exercising his
statutory right to appeal through a trial de novo in superior court.50
According to Justice Stewart, “A person convicted of an offense is entitled
to pursue his statutory right to a trial de novo, without apprehension that
the State will retaliate by substituting a more serious charge for the original
one, thus subjecting him to a significantly increased potential period of
incarceration.”51 In discussing prosecutors’ motivations in deterring
defendants from exercising their rights, Justice Stewart continued, “[I]f the
prosecutor has the means readily at hand to discourage such appeals – by
‘upping the ante’ through a felony indictment whenever a convicted
misdemeanant pursues his statutory appellate remedy – the State can
insure that only the most hardy defendants will brave the hazards of a de
novo trial.”52

45
Id. “Faced with crowded court dockets and a scarcity of resources, the
prosecutor's office has an institutional bias against a defendant exercising
constitutional or statutory rights that may delay or complicate the proceedings. Using
his substantial powers of selective enforcement, the prosecutor can both threaten and
punish a defendant exercising these rights by forcing him to risk suffering a greater
penalty.” Id. at 474–75. This Note uses third-person plural pronouns in place of
gendered third-person singular pronouns.
46
417 U.S. 21 (1974).
47
Id. at 22.
48
Id. (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-290 (1969)).
49
Id. at 22–23.
50
Id. at 28–29.
51
Id. at 28.
52
Id. at 27–28.
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In Bordenkircher v. Hayes, however, the Supreme Court refused to
extend the principle of Blackledge to plea negotiations.53 Defendant
Hayes was indicted for forgery and offered a plea deal requiring him to
serve five years in prison.54 Prosecutors pressured Hayes to accept the
deal by threatening to charge him under the Habitual Criminal Act, which
would mandate a life sentence upon conviction.55 Hayes rejected the plea
but was found guilty at trial and subsequently sentenced to mandatory life
imprisonment.56 The Court held that a prosecutor adding charges as
punishment for the rejection of a plea deal was constitutional because “the
prosecutor’s interest at the bargaining table is to persuade the defendant to
forgo his right to plead not guilty.”57 The Court found that the prosecutor
in Hayes “no more than openly presented the defendant with the
unpleasant alternatives of forgoing trial or facing charges on which he was
plainly subject to prosecution.”58
The Supreme Court further curtailed Blackledge in the 1982 decision
U.S. v. Goodwin.59 There, the Court established both the “presumption of
prosecutorial vindictiveness” test and the “objective evidence” test now
used by Missouri courts.60 Under the presumption test, a defendant must
first create a presumption of prosecutorial vindictiveness by showing a
reasonable likelihood that vindictiveness motivated the prosecutor’s
action.61 The presumption test allows courts to infer vindictiveness from
the prosecutor’s conduct and is “designed to spare courts the ‘unseemly
task’ of probing the actual motives of the prosecutor.”62 To meet the
objective evidence test, a defendant must “prove objectively that the
prosecutor's charging decision was motivated by a desire to punish him for
doing something that the law plainly allowed him to do.” 63 Thus, the
objective evidence test requires a defendant to bring some other proof of
vindictive motive before the court and such a motive cannot be inferred
from conduct like the presumption test.64

53

434 U.S. 357, 365 (1978).
Id. at 358.
55
Id.
56
Id. at 359.
57
Id. at 364.
58
Id. at 365.
59
457 U.S. 368 (1982).
60
Id. at 381.
61
Id. at 373.
62
Id. at 372.
63
Id. at 384 (emphasis added).
64
See id. at 384 n.19.
54
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Justice Stevens also differentiated charging a defendant with an
additional or enhanced charge during the pretrial stage from doing so
during the trial and post-conviction stages.65 During the pretrial stage, the
prosecutor may still be learning new information. In contrast, during the
trial and post-conviction stages, the prosecutor has discovered and
assessed all of the information about a case. It is, therefore, more likely at
the trial and post-conviction stages that an enhanced charge is improperly
motivated.66 The decision in Goodwin created an extremely difficult
burden of proving a presumption of vindictiveness for defendants at the
pretrial stage.67

B. Prosecutorial Vindictiveness in Missouri
The first Missouri appellate case to consider the issue of prosecutorial
vindictiveness was State v. Quimby, which took a lighter approach to pretrial prosecutorial vindictiveness than Goodwin.68 The defendant,
Quimby, had originally been charged with misdemeanor assault.69
However, the charges were dropped after Quimby requested a jury trial,
and the prosecutor then charged Quimby with felony burglary arising out
of the same incident as the original assault charge.70 Quimby alleged that
on the day he informed the prosecutor of his intent to go to trial, the
prosecutor said, “If you request a jury trial, I'll file a Class ‘B’ felony of
burglary in the first degree.”71 Applying Blackledge, Bordenkircher, and
Goodwin, the Missouri Court of Appeals held that the presence of
prosecutorial coercion was “conclusively established” by the evidence,
meeting the objective evidence test.72 The main factors in favor of finding
vindictiveness were that the defendant had never engaged in plea
negotiations, and the prosecutors had obtained no new information that
would warrant an increase in charges.73 In fashioning this holding, the
court implied that a prosecutor enhancing charges after a breakdown in
plea negotiations might not raise the presumption of prosecutorial
vindictiveness, following the logic of Goodwin.74
65

Id. at 381.
Id.
67
See Garnick, supra note 1, at 509.
68
716 S.W.2d 327 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986).
69
Id. at 328.
70
Id.
71
Id.
72
Id. at 332.
73
Id.
74
See id.
66
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After Quimby, Missouri appellate courts began applying a rigid
distinction between Quimby’s prosecutorial decision in the plea bargaining
phase versus other pretrial, trial, and post-trial phases.75 In State v.
Cayson, the Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District, held that there
was a presumption of prosecutorial vindictiveness when a prosecutor
increased charges from one second-degree robbery charge to two firstdegree robbery charges based on the same incident.76 The increased
charges came after the defendant successfully moved for a mistrial due to
an instructional error by the prosecutor during voir dire.77 In an almost
identical case, State v. Potts, the Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern
District, held that there was a presumption of prosecutorial vindictiveness
when the prosecutor enhanced charges from possession to possession with
intent to distribute after the defendant successfully moved for a mistrial
based on the prosecutor’s reference during voir dire to the defendant’s
possible testimony at trial.78
In contrast, the Missouri courts of appeals have routinely rejected
claims of prosecutorial vindictiveness in the pretrial stage, no matter how
severe.79 In State v. Molinett, the Western District held that there was no
presumption of prosecutorial vindictiveness when a prosecutor enhanced
a distribution of a controlled substance charge to include that the defendant
was a prior drug offender after the defendant withdrew his plea offer,
which subjected the defendant to a harsher sentence after conviction.80 In
State v. Sapien, the Western District held that a defendant did not raise a
presumption of prosecutorial vindictiveness when the prosecutor amended
two charges of first-degree child molestation to the greater offenses of
first-degree statutory sodomy in response to Sapien rejecting a plea offer.81
The court held that prosecutors are within their rights to influence
defendants to plead guilty by either “charging heavily upfront and offering
to dismiss charges or amend them to lesser offenses” or “charging lightly
at the outset and warning of possible additional charges.” 82 The court held

75

Compare State v. Cayson, 747 S.W.2d 155, 158 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (finding
prosecutorial vindictiveness for additional charges filed after a mistrial) with State v.
Molinett, 876 S.W.2d 806, 809 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that prosecutor’s
decision to increase charges after a plea deal fell through was “rather a proper exercise
of prosecutorial discretion”).
76
Id. at 156–58.
77
Id. at 156.
78
181 S.W.3d 228, 231–32, 237 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005).
79
See, e.g., 876 S.W.2d at 808–10.
80
Id.
81
337 S.W.3d 72, 75 (Mo. Ct. App. 2011).
82
Id. at 80.
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that neither situation would create a presumption of prosecutorial
vindictiveness. 83
In State v. Gardner, the Supreme Court of Missouri considered its
first case of prosecutorial vindictiveness.84 The defendant, Gardner, was
living with a married couple, Phillip Hancock and Carol Drummond.85
Gardner shot and killed Hancock, allegedly while Hancock threatened
Drummond with a knife.86 However, an investigation revealed that
Drummond was possibly in a relationship with the defendant, and
Drummond had discussed killing her husband with various friends and
family members.87 Four years after the crime, a newly elected prosecutor
charged the defendant with voluntary manslaughter.88 The statute of
limitations on voluntary manslaughter was three years, and after the
defendant refused to waive his statute of limitations defense, the
prosecutor increased the charge to second-degree murder.89 The court
reiterated that a defendant could establish a presumption of prosecutorial
vindictiveness by showing a realistic likelihood of vindictiveness in the
prosecutor’s enhancement of charges.90 When considering whether a
realistic likelihood of vindictiveness exists, the court held that Missouri
courts should consider (1) the prosecutor’s stake in deterring the exercise
of some right and (2) the prosecutor’s conduct.91 The court held that
Gardner had not established a presumption of prosecutorial vindictiveness
because the prosecutor had acted within his discretion, and the charge of
second-degree murder fit the defendant’s alleged conduct.92
State v. Murray added a restriction on allegations of prosecutorial
vindictiveness: there must be an augmentation of charges to establish a
presumption of prosecutorial vindictiveness in the pretrial context.93
Murray was charged with unlawful use of a weapon, but the State
dismissed the charge.94 After Murray filed a civil lawsuit alleging
malicious prosecution, the prosecutor reinstated the same charge, and

83

Id.
8 S.W.3d 66 (Mo. 1999) (en banc).
85
Id. at 68.
86
Id.
87
Id.
88
Id.
89
Id. at 70.
90
Id.
91
Id.
92
Id.
93
925 S.W.2d 492, 493 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996).
94
Id.
84
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Murray was subsequently convicted after a jury trial.95 The Eastern
District held that there was no presumption of prosecutorial vindictiveness
because there was no enhancement of charges during the pretrial stage,
merely reinstatement of a charge.96 However, the augmentation
requirement only applies to the presumption test, not the objective
evidence test.97 Because State v. Murray involved reinstatement of the
same charges and potential penalty, it left open the question of whether an
increase in penalty but not charge could satisfy the presumption of
prosecutorial vindictiveness in the pretrial stage.

C. The Death Penalty in Missouri and Prosecutorial Vindictiveness
Missouri defines first-degree murder as “knowingly caus[ing] the
death of another person after deliberation upon the matter.”98 The only
available punishments for first-degree murder are life imprisonment
without the possibility for parole and the death penalty.99 A prosecutor
must prove a statutory aggravating factor beyond a reasonable doubt. 100
Then, a jury or judge decides whether the evidence as a whole, taking into
account both aggravating and mitigating factors, justifies a death
sentence.101
In State ex rel. Patterson v. Randall, the Supreme Court of Missouri
applied the two-part prosecutorial vindictiveness test to a death penalty
case.102 Dale Patterson was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to
life imprisonment after the State announced that it would not seek the
death penalty.103 The Supreme Court of Missouri reversed Patterson’s
conviction based on prosecutorial misconduct and granted Patterson a new
trial.104 On retrial, the State filed a notice of intent to seek the death
penalty, to which Patterson responded by moving to strike the notice. 105
The trial court overruled Patterson’s motion, but the Supreme Court of
Missouri reversed, holding that the prosecutor’s act of seeking the death
penalty on retrial raised a presumption of prosecutorial vindictiveness in
95

Id.
Id.
97
Id. at 519–20 (Russell, J., dissenting).
98
MO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 565.020 (2017).
99
Id.
100
MO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 565.032 (2017).
101
Id. Missouri has seventeen aggravating factors. Id.
102
State ex rel. Patterson v. Randall, 637 S.W.2d 16, 18 (Mo. 1982) (en banc).
103
Id. at 17.
104
Id.
105
Id.
96
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violation of Patterson’s right to due process.106 The court held that both a
more serious charge and a more serious penalty could sustain an allegation
of prosecutorial vindictiveness.107 Writing for the majority, Judge Higgins
reasoned that if due process prohibits the state from increasing charges
based on a defendant invoking the right to appeal, “the same is necessarily
true of subjecting the defendant to a more serious penalty subsequent to
his successful appeal.”108
Because the court found a presumption of prosecutorial
vindictiveness based on an enhanced prospective penalty after a successful
appeal, the burden shifted to the State to rebut the presumption. 109 While
the State tried to argue that there was no increase in charges, the court
rejected that argument, stating that it was the increased penalty that made
the charge “more serious.”110

IV. INSTANT DECISION
In a 4-3 decision, the Supreme Court of Missouri made permanent
the writ of prohibition, finding that the defendant had not proved a
presumption of prosecutorial vindictiveness and thus could not compel the
prosecutor to testify.111 The court remanded the case to determine if
Hodges could meet the objective evidence test without the prosecutor’s
testimony.112

A. Majority Opinion
The Supreme Court of Missouri held that a prosecutor’s rationale for
seeking a specific punishment is a mental impression that is protected
under the work-product doctrine.113 Defendants cannot compel a
prosecutor to testify to attempt to satisfy either the objective evidence test
or the presumption test.114 Instead of allowing a defendant to use a
prosecutor’s testimony to prove either test, defendants must now prove
either test;then, a prosecutor can choose to testify to rebut the defendant’s

106

Id. 17–19.
Id. at 18.
108
Id. at 19.
109
Id. at 18.
110
Id.
111
State ex rel. Becker v. Wood, 611 S.W.3d 510, 513–14 (Mo. 2020) (en banc).
112
Id. at 514.
113
Id. at 513
114
Id. at 514.
107
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presumption.115 Thus, a writ of prohibition is an appropriate remedy to
prevent disclosure of protected work-product.116 The court also held that
while a prosecutor cannot be forced to testify about their decision to seek
a specific punishment, if a defendant can show either 1) a presumption of
prosecutorial vindictiveness or 2) objective evidence that a prosecutor
acted with the sole intention of punishing the defendant, the burden would
shift to the State to disprove the prosecutorial vindictiveness charge.117
The prosecutor could then choose to either testify and disclose their work
product to rebut the claim or not attempt to rebut the charge and let the
court grant the motion that raised prosecutorial vindictiveness.118
In analyzing Hodges under the presumption of prosecutorial
vindictiveness test, the court refused to find a presumption of prosecutorial
vindictiveness because 1) there was no augmentation of charges, and 2)
prosecutorial vindictiveness is rarely found in the pretrial stage.119 The
majority, citing three Missouri cases, found that the death penalty was not
an augmentation of charges.120 The court also reasoned that prosecutorial
vindictiveness is rarely found at the pretrial stage and usually comes into
play after a defendant has successfully won an appeal and is then subject
to an enhanced charge on retrial.121
Finding that Hodges did not meet the presumption of prosecutorial
vindictiveness, the Supreme Court of Missouri remanded the case for a
hearing on the motion to strike without the prosecutor’s testimony. 122 The
court left open the possibility that Hodges could still win his motion to
strike if he could show objective evidence of prosecutorial
vindictiveness.123
However, without any ability to question the
prosecuting attorneys, Hodges would have an extremely hard time meeting
the burden of the objective evidence test.

B. The Dissent
Judge Mary Russell filed a dissent joined by Judge Laura Denver
Stith and Chief Justice George W. Draper III. 124 Judge Russell criticized
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the majority for “downplay[ing] the State’s eleventh hour filing of its
notice of intent to seek the death penalty.”125 Judge Russell highlighted the
odd behavior of the prosecutor, who waited seven months after taking
office to file the notice of intent to seek the death penalty.126
Judge Russell reiterated the rule that defendants can shift the burden
to the state by (1) proving a presumption of prosecutorial vindictiveness
or (2) by showing through objective evidence that the sole purpose of the
state’s action was to penalize the defendant.127 Judge Russell pushed back
against the majority’s analysis of “whether the charge here was
augmented.”128 Judge Russel argued that while the death penalty may not
be an augmentation of charges, State ex rel. Patterson v. Randall held that
the death penalty as an augmentation of penalty is sufficient to satisfy the
presumption of prosecutorial vindictiveness test.129 While Judge Russell
agreed with the majority that Hodges had not yet established a
presumption of prosecutorial vindictiveness, “the analysis of the principal
opinion categorically forecloses such a conclusion without hearing
evidence.”130
If a defendant cannot meet the presumption test, Judge Russell
argued, prosecutors should be compelled to testify under the “objective
evidence” test for two reasons.131 First, “a prosecutor’s requisite candor
toward the circuit court does not carry the same significance as testimony
given directly after an oath or affirmation.”132 Second, “the reason for the
delay is not something that can be gleaned from available objective
evidence such as referencing a docket sheet.”133 Absent extraordinary
circumstances where a prosecutor willfully reveals their malicious intent,
compelling the prosecutor to testify is the only way for defendants to
uncover the objective evidence needed to establish prosecutorial
vindictiveness.134 Judge Russell further argued that there is no risk of a
slippery slope leading to prosecutors always being compelled to testify
because circuit court judges could exercise discretion and only require
testimony in “peculiar or unusual” circumstances.135
125
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V. COMMENT
While previous federal and Missouri appellate cases created a narrow
window for claiming prosecutorial vindictiveness, State ex rel. Becker v.
Wood has almost shut that window entirely. The court maintains the
prosecutorial vindictiveness tests reiterated in past Missouri cases:
defendants can either establish a presumption of prosecutorial
vindictiveness by showing a realistic likelihood that vindictiveness exists
based on the prosecutor’s conduct, or they can present objective evidence
that the prosecuting attorney acted with the sole intention of punishing a
defendant for exercising a constitutional right.136 However, the majority’s
analysis of the presumption test is flawed for multiple reasons, including
its refusal to recognize the death penalty as an augmentation.137 While the
language of the court seems to leave open the possibility that a defendant
could still be successful on their claim of prosecutorial vindictiveness
under the objective evidence test, the holdings of Wood leave a defendant
with no tools to challenge a prosecutor’s decision. This effectively creates
an impossible standard that bars prosecutorial vindictiveness claims at the
pretrial stage and makes it incredibly difficult to prove at later stages.

A. The Presumption of Prosecutorial Vindictiveness Test
The majority held that Hodges had not raised a presumption of
prosecutorial vindictiveness because there was no augmentation of
charges, and Missouri courts rarely find prosecutorial vindictiveness in the
pretrial stage.138 However, the stark language used in the opinion pushes
these concepts to the extreme, creating an almost insurmountable standard
that few, if any, defendants like Hodges could satisfy.
First, while it is rare for Missouri courts of appeals to find
prosecutorial vindictiveness at the pretrial stage, it has happened before in
State v. Quimby.139 Quimby was the first Missouri appellate case to
consider prosecutorial vindictiveness after the Supreme Court of the
United States’ decisions of Blackledge and Goodwin.140 The court in
Quimby found prosecutorial vindictiveness in the pretrial stage after the
prosecutor said to the defendant, “If you request a jury trial, I'll file a Class
‘B’ felony of burglary in the first degree.”141 While Quimby can be
136
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differentiated from other cases in that the defendant did not engage in any
plea bargaining, the court did not explicitly make that distinction. 142 The
majority cited seven cases where prosecutorial vindictiveness was not
found at the pretrial stage while failing to mention even one case where it
was, including Quimby.143 Judge Fisher concluded that there was no
reasonable likelihood of vindictiveness because “there has been no
successful appeal or grant of retrial in this case.”144 This language seems
to indicate that the court will not find prosecutorial vindictiveness in future
cases at the pretrial stage regardless of whether there was plea bargaining,
potentially going against its own precedent.
Second, the majority’s analysis of the presumption test fails to
satisfactorily analyze the prosecutor’s conduct. After reiterating that a
prosecutor’s conduct must be weighed when analyzing a presumption of
prosecutorial vindictiveness, the majority found that the State’s conduct in
Hodges’ case “fails to establish a reasonable likelihood of
vindictiveness.”145 The majority only mentions the timing of the notice of
intent once, noting, “A prosecuting attorney certainly possesses the
discretion to seek any statutorily authorized sentence seven weeks before
trial is set to begin.”146
However, this offhand statement by the majority severely undercuts
the amount of time it takes to prepare for a capital murder case compared
to a first-degree murder case. In Hodges, the new prosecutor waited a year
after Hodges filed a notice of intent to proceed to trial and seven months
after he had taken office to file the notice of intent to seek the death
penalty.147 Becker therefore had seven months to prepare arguments for
proving the aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt, while defense
counsel had only seven weeks not only to craft arguments to rebut the
aggravating factors but also prepare mitigation evidence.148 This would
put any prosecutor at a substantial advantage.149 By refusing to
acknowledge the suspicious amount of time that the prosecutor waited in
filing the notice of intent, the Court adopts willful blindness to conduct
that would point to a presumption of prosecutorial vindictiveness.
Third, the majority’s application of the presumption test does not
categorize the death penalty as an augmentation. The majority argues that
142
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“Hodges was subject to death the day he was indicted for first-degree
murder… importantly, the State did not waive the death penalty at any
point.”150 However, the fact that a defendant was “subject” to a more
severe charge or penalty the day they were indicted is not a bar to a claim
for prosecutorial vindictiveness.151 Indeed, this is what happens in every
successful claim of prosecutorial vindictiveness, such as State v. Cayson
and State v. Potts.152 As discussed in Part III, the prosecutor in Cayson
increased charges from one second-degree robbery charge to two firstdegree robbery charges based on the same incident, charges to which the
defendant was certainly subject. Yet, the Western District nevertheless
found prosecutorial vindictiveness.153 In State v. Potts, the fact that the
prosecutor enhanced charges from possession alone to possession with
intent to distribute, to which the defendant was certainly “subject” on the
day he was indicted for possession, did not stop the Southern District from
finding prosecutorial vindictiveness.154 Under the majority’s logic,
increases in penalty, but not charges, are acceptable so long as the
defendant was subject to that penalty at the time of their indictment.
Fourth, the majority also erred in failing to mention or distinguish
State ex rel. Patterson v. Randall.155 As Judge Russell noted in her
dissent,156 Patterson was a prior Supreme Court of Missouri opinion that
explicitly held that either augmentation of charges or penalty could
support a presumption of prosecutorial vindictiveness.157 Patterson also
contains nearly identical facts to Hodges: a prior prosecutor opted not to
seek the death penalty, but a newly elected prosecutor chose to seek it.158
The only difference between the two cases is that Patterson alleged
prosecutorial vindictiveness after a successful appeal, whereas Hodges
alleged it at the pretrial stage.159 Curiously, the majority did cite Patterson
once for establishing the burden shift to the prosecutor once a presumption
of prosecutorial vindictiveness arises.160 However, any mention of the
150
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substance of Patterson or its nearly identical fact pattern is omitted. The
majority essentially ignores Patterson’s finding that augmentation of
penalty, specifically the death penalty, is sufficient to meet the Gardner
augmentation requirement.161 By ignoring this precedent, the court leaves
open questions about the continued validity of Patterson. Judge Fischer
wrote, “because the State did not augment or change the initial charge of
first-degree murder, Hodges’ allegations do not create a presumption of
prosecutorial vindictiveness.”162 This language indicates that the Court
does not endorse the view of Patterson that an increase in penalty can also
create a presumption of prosecutorial vindictiveness.163 This confusion
could have a chilling effect on defendants moving for appeal.164 Under
Wood, prosecutors can also now threaten defendants with the death
penalty, at least at the pretrial stage, due to the majority’s ruling that the
death penalty does not satisfy the Gardner augmentation requirement for
the presumption test.165 In holding this, the majority goes against Missouri
precedent in State ex rel. Patterson v. Randall.166 By turning away from
Patterson, prosecutors can now use the death penalty as a threat to prevent
defendants from exercising their constitutional rights to a jury trial or to
appeal. The majority’s failure to consider the prosecutor’s conduct in State
ex rel. Becker v. Wood also signals to prosecutors that they will face no
consequences if they wait until the last minute to file a notice of intent to
seek the death penalty or increase charges in general. Prosecutors can gain
a massive advantage in building their case while surprising defense
lawyers with charges at the last minute with no ramifications.

B. The Objective Evidence Test
The court declined to rule on whether Hodges had met the objective
evidence test, holding that:
this Court does not foreclose the possibility that prosecutorial
vindictiveness may still be found after a hearing on Hodges’ motion to
strike. If Hodges, during the hearing on his motion, presents objective
evidence supporting prosecutorial vindictiveness, the circuit court
could properly require the State to choose between rebutting the claim
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of prosecutorial vindictiveness on the record or permitting the court to
sustain the motion to strike in this case.167

While on their face, these words seem to indicate that Hodges still
has a chance, refusing to require the prosecution to testify has eliminated
any possibility that Hodges can still succeed on his motion. The standard
in Missouri under the objective evidence test is that the defendant must
give “persuasive objective evidence that the attorney acted with the sole
intention of punishing the defendant for exercising a constitutional
right.”168 The courts have already created a nearly impossible hill to climb
with the sole-intention caveat, as a prosecutor could easily create post hoc
arguments that satisfy this standard. By allowing prosecutors to refuse a
court’s order to testify in extreme cases, the Supreme Court of Missouri
has effectively made the objective evidence test impossible for any
defendant to meet. Barring a prosecutor uttering the words, “I am
increasing your charge with the sole intention of punishing you for
exercising your constitutional rights,” no defendant will be able to meet
the objective evidence test. Judge Russell proposed one persuasive
solution to this problem in her dissent, which would allow circuit judges
to exercise their discretion and, in unusual circumstances, allow
defendants to compel prosecutors to testify so that they can meet the
objective evidence test.169
While the majority in State ex rel. Becker v. Wood acts as though
Hodges can still use the objective evidence test, the court has created an
unassailable burden for Hodges and other defendants. Defendants must
show objective evidence that a prosecutor’s sole intention was to punish a
defendant, which is already an incredibly high standard.170 Not allowing
defendants to compel prosecutors to testify leaves defendants with no
means to meet the objective evidence test, thus completely negating the
test altogether.

VI. CONCLUSION
Since Blackledge and Quimby, federal and Missouri state courts have
eroded the ability of defendants to prevail on claims of prosecutorial
vindictiveness. State ex rel. Becker v. Wood continues this tradition and
sets the bar even higher. First, under the presumption test, State ex rel.
Becker v. Wood essentially precludes any prosecutorial vindictiveness
167
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claims at the pretrial stage. Prosecutors can commit egregious conduct at
the pretrial stage and remain immune to claims of prosecutorial
vindictiveness. Second, prosecutors can also now use the death penalty to
threaten and coerce defendants at the pretrial stage and possibly the posttrial stages, due to the finding in Wood that augmentation of charges is not
enough to satisfy Gardner. Third, defendants must now provide objective
evidence under the second test without the ability to examine prosecutors
in a hearing.
Overall, State ex rel. Becker v. Wood represents the most rigid of
rules for prosecutorial vindictiveness, giving prosecutors even more power
than they already have. Prosecutors now have unprecedented freedom at
the pretrial stage and during first-degree murder proceedings when
deciding the penalty. State ex rel. Becker v. Wood has stripped defendants
of the ability to prove a case of prosecutorial vindictiveness in these
situations, leaving defendants no way to check prosecutors when they
overstep.
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